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Book Review

RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS. By Larry W.
Yackle. * Cambridge, Massachusetts.: Harvard University
Press. 1994. Pp. 297. Hardcover, $39.95.
Barry Friedman**

The 1960's and 1970's are gone, and with them that brief
period in which a progressive Supreme Court expanded the protections of the Constitution in the face of contrary majority
views. Increasingly, scholars question whether this description is
even accurate, whether the federal courts did act in a
countermajoritarian fashiont and whether they were able to or
did much to effect social change beyond that accomplished in the
political process.z But something unique in judicial history did
seem to have happened during the era of the Warren Court. For
many liberal scholars, this time was Camelot.
Larry Yackle is one of those scholars. In his recent, penetrating book on federal jurisdiction, Yackle plainly yearns for
those lost golden days. The problem, as Yackle sees it, is that
"[t]he Supreme Court's decisions in recent years have taken far
too much decision-making authority away from the federal
courts and given it to the courts of the states. In that process, the
federal courts have lost the capacity to check the great power of
government in American society." Yackle paints the current issue in the law of federal jurisdiction as "a heated ideological debate between those I will dare call 'liberals,' who almost always
prefer the federal courts in cases in which federal rights must be
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Susan Bandes,
Larry Kramer, Bill Stuntz, and Mike Wells for their thoughts on an earlier draft of this
review.
1. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 607-09
(1993).
2. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (U. of Chicago Press, 1991); Girardeau A. Spann, Race Against the Coun (New
York U. Press, 1993).
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determined, and those I will call 'conservatives,' who typically
urge that the state courts be employed." "Lest there be any
doubt," he proclaims with apparent pride, "I am a liberal."
Yackle not only yearns for bygone days, he comes with a
prescription to return to them. To meet the threat that Yackle
sees, "Congress should enact a series of new statutes to reclaim
the federal courts for their vital role in this constitutional democracy." While much of his book is a detailed "internal critique" of
the rightward trend of federal jurisdiction, each chapter concludes with a specific statutory suggestion to address the criticisms he levels. Some of the legislation Yackle seeks would be
new, or would implement reform proposals long ignored by Congress, such as the extension of federal question jurisdiction beyond the bounds of the Mottley well-pleaded complaint rule.3
But much of Yackle's legislative agenda quite obviously is
designed to reverse the restrictions placed upon the exercise of
federal jurisdiction by the Rehnquist Court.
I will have my questions to ask about Yackle's agenda, about
where it is he is going, why he wants to go there, and whether his
agenda will get him where he wants to go. Despite my questions,
however, make no mistake about the value of this book. Reclaiming the Federal Courts is a passionate piece of work by a
scholar who cares deeply about the use of the law, and courts, to
ease the plight of the victims of government excess. It is popular
in these times to worry about the victims of government excess,4
but the populace seldom seems concerned when government excess threatens individual liberties, particularly when the liberties
at stake are those of individuals who "are either unpopular in
themselves (for example, the rights of criminal defendants) or
are asserted by unpopular people (for example, political dissenters)." In any society that dares to call itself free, these people
need champions, and their champions are the guardians of the
liberty of all of us. Yackle is one of these champions.
Yackle particularly deserves credit for the mission he accepts, that of unmasking the arcane law of federal jurisdiction to
reveal its impact on substantive rights. Yackle leaves to others
the "diminution of individual liberty that has attended the coming of the Rehnquist Court." While he addresses the "erosion of
federal rights indirectly," his ground is the "[d]eadly dry and con3.

Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
This, in part, seems to be the concern of the Contract with America. E.g., Ed
Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., Contract With America 125 (Times Books, 1994) ("Isn't
it time we got Washington off our backs?").
4.
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fusing doctrines" that we call the law of federal jurisdiction.
Yackle cogently attacks this technical body of law with force and
vision, making the impact of jurisdictional decisions plain for all
to see.
Following an introduction, there are essentially two parts to
Yackle's book. There is a first chapter in which Yackle sets the
stage, detailing the debate over the relative parity of federal and
state courts, and reviewing the history that leads Yackle to conclude we have come to favor a "Legal Process" model of federal
jurisdiction. In this chapter, Yackle expresses his evident disdain
for what he sees to be the Legal Process argument that litigation
in any court is as good as the next. Rather, it is his preference
that "federal question cases []be in federal court." What follows
are four chapters treating, in this order, justiciability, federal
question jurisdiction, abstention, and habeas corpus. In each
chapter Yackle ably describes the doctrinal development, criticizes it, and concludes with a legislative proposal that would
open wide the doors of the federal courts. Indeed, no mere proposals are these; Yackle actually has drafted the necessary
statutes.
While Yackle's legislative agenda is designed to answer
questions about what the law of federal jurisdiction should be, in
reality the book raises far more questions than it answers. That,
in and of itself, might be a good thing. The questions raised,
however, are troubling in a way that extends far beyond this
book to the entire endeavor of federal jurisdiction scholarship.
Yackle is stuck in a time warp, as are many of the scholars that
write in the area of federal jurisdiction. Yackle criticizes the
Legal Process methodology, but in a sense he is trapped in it, as
are his contemporaries.s
The problem finds its root, and all too often its branch, in
Hart and Wechsler's seminal federal jurisdiction casebook. As
Akhil Amar has observed, the book was out of date almost at the
time it was published.6 Writing before Brown v. Board of Education, 1 and much of the work of the Warren Court, the Hart and
Wechsler approach maintains an almost naive belief that state
5. For an interesting recent debate about the utility of the Hart and Wechsler para·
digm, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand.
L. Rev. 953 (1994); Michael Wells, Busting the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 11 Const.
Comm. 557 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms," 12
Const. Comm. 3 (1995). See also Mary Brigid McManamon, Challenging the Hart and
Wechsler Paradigm, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 833 (1995).
6. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688, 703 (1989).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). As I completed this article, I relied on the current (third)
edition of the Hart and Wechsler case book for citations. In the current edition Brown is
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and federal courts are fungible, and a now counter-historical position that state courts are the ultimate guardians of constitutional liberty. That might once have been, and may be again, but
as Yackle ably points out, during the Warren era the federal
courts were the ones that mattered to civil libertarians, and the
differences between state and federal courts often were vast.
Thus, Yackle's gripe with Hart and Wechsler is that they assumed
"there was nothing to choose between the federal and state
courts. There was something to be explored and decided. Hart
and Wechsler ducked the really fundamental question."
The disappointment is that Yackle, like many federal jurisdiction scholars, has done little more than decide the parity question in favor of federal courts. Moreover, Yackle seems to do so
from within, rather than without, the Legal Process model.
Refighting old battles with new (or, for that matter, old) premises may not have much to do with today's landscape. Yackle's
book is a thorough repudiation of the current state of the law of
federal jurisdiction, but ultimately the book falls short of prescribing what I believe is a pertinent agenda for the future.
I, like Yackle, have an internal and external critique. Initially, I identify what seem to be five fundamental difficulties
with Yackle's own agenda. Then, I map out briefly the directions
I believe federal jurisdiction scholarship should move to take us
into the next century.
First, Yackle's legislative agenda seems poorly designed to
address what really concerns him, the vindication of federal
rights. In large part the poor fit between agenda and problem
finds its root in a certain schizophrenia to Yackle's project. At
times, Yackle says his concern is seeing that federal rights be vindicated in federal courts.s At other times, Yackle says he wants
federal questions resolved in federal courts.9 The two are not the
same, however.
While it is evident Yackle's real goal is enforcement of federal civil rights, sweeping all federal questions into federal courts
will only limit the availability of federal courts to do what Yackle
mentioned but three times, none significantly. See Bator, et. al., The Federal Courts and
the Federal System (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1988).
8. E.g., Larry W. Yackle, Reclaiming the Federal Courts 4 (Harvard U. Press, 1994)
("The federal courts are under siege and can be rescued, and federal rights with
them,... "); id. at 9 (" 'liberals,' who almost always prefer the federal courts in cases in
which federal rights must be determined, ... ").
9. E.g., id. at 3 ("I begin with the ,arguments supporting a preference for federal
courts in cases implicating federal legal questions."); id. at 12 ("I have said that liberals
generally prefer the federal courts in federal question cases.").
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wants. As Yackle observes, federal judicial resources are limited.
Yet, Yackle calls for sweeping federal jurisdiction in almost every
instance. Take, for example, his chapter on "arising under" jurisdiction. He proposes that the federal courts "shall have jurisdiction of any civil action in which it appears that the determination
or application of a substantial question of federal law can resolve
the dispute between the parties." Further, "[i]t shall be sufficient
if the complaint ... advances a claim for relief in which the federal question is an essential element." Under Yackle's proposed
statute "the federal district courts would have jurisdiction in a
case like Merrell Dow."1o Merrell Dow was a case in which plaintiffs brought a product liability action involving the drug Bendectin in state court. One of their causes of action alleged
negligence for violating the labeling requirements of the federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. On the basis of that claim, defendants removed the action to federal court. The Supreme
Court held removal was inappropriate.
Whether cases like Merrell Dow belong in federal court is a
difficult and interesting question, but it is mystifying why ensuring they can be there is part of Yackle's agenda. To the contrary,
one might suppose that Yackle would not want numerous state
tort actions to crowd out plaintiffs with federal rights claims.
Similarly, Yackle essentially would reverse most abstention doctrines, including Burfordu abstention, a doctrine that requires
federal courts to defer to certain state administrative proceedings. Burford itself would have involved the federal courts in
complicated proceedings to determine where oil wells could be
drilled, yet the federal claims in the case were quite tenuous. The
problem, as I discuss later, is one of resource allocation. If protecting federal rights is the goal, moving all federal questions to
federal court hardly seems the solution.
Almost odder than what Yackle includes, however, is what
he ignores. For example, Yackle fails to tackle the Eleventh
Amendment. Similarly, he has little to say about judicially fashioned immunity doctrines.12 Both these doctrinal areas present
huge obstacles to full relief for those whose federal rights were
10. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). Yackle at
251 n.45 (cited in note 8). Yackle does agree Congress could explicitly provide that no
such jurisdiction exists for private lawsuits to enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Yackle at 251 (cited in note 8).
11. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
12. This may be because strictly speaking these doctrines are not jurisdictional, but
at other times Yackle does not adhere to this distinction. See Yackle at 177-84 (cited in
note 8) (discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and the doctrine of retroactivity).
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violated. At the same time, even under existing "arising under"
jurisdictional rules, the plaintiffs Yackle really cares about, like
Richard Steffel,13 already get into federal court. Yackle seems to
have adopted a "more is better" approach, rather than designing
his strategy to fit his ideological goal.
Second, even if Yackle's agenda is the correct one, it is entirely unclear why he thinks there is any hope of getting Congress
to go along. The best example here is habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Yackle is one of the nation's preeminent advocates of the Great
Writ, and the proposals in his book would overturn many of the
barriers to relief imposed by the Supreme Court. He writes,
however, at a time when habeas corpus jurisdiction has been
under consistent and severe attack in Congress. As I write, Congress appears poised to take action to curtail the writ. While
I share many of Yackle's beliefs with regard to habeas jurisdiction, he might have recommended something with greater plausibility. Much of the book shares this aura of the Utopian yet
unachievable.
Third, even if Yackle could get his proposals through Congress, it is unclear why he thinks Congress necessarily is better
than the courts at allocating federal jurisdiction to achieve the
goals he wishes. Yackle takes me to task for suggesting that the
formulation of federal jurisdiction is or ought to be a shared endeavor between the federal courts and Congress.t4 But Congress
13. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). Yackle begins the "arising under"
chapter with Steffel's story. These case-based vignettes at the start of each chapter are an
effective teaching tool, but in this case the choice of story is telling. Steffel involved a
plaintiff who carne to federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that a threatened state
prosecution for handbilling against the Vietnam war violated his first amendment rights.
The federal courts took jurisdiction, and even declined to abstain although Steffel's companion was being prosecuted. I have always had some difficulty squaring cases like Steffel, seeking a declaration that a state law prosecution would violate federal rights, with
cases like Franchise of California Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1
(1983) and Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Those latter
cases seem to hold that "[i]f, but for the availability of the declaratory judgment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created action, jurisdiction
is lacking." Charles A. Wright, et. al., lOA Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2767 at 74445 (West, 2d ed. 1983) (quoted in Yackle at 111 (cited in note 8)). Yackle seems to share
my difficulty, though he valiantly tries to reconcile the lines. Yackle at 110-12 (cited in
note 8). Yackle ultimately would reject the Skelly Oil rule, but what is ironic is that
Yackle would bring Tax Board and Skelly-in which federal civil rights are not involved-into federal court, while Steffel already is there.
14. Yackle at 138 (cited in note 8). Actually, Yackle focuses too much on one footnote I have written, ignoring to some extent the point of the broader work. In A Different
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1
(1990), I argue that the Constitution should be read as granting shared power to Congress
and the Supreme Court to define the extent of federal jurisdiction. I briefly muse that if
the Constitution is interpreted to permit Congress to foist jurisdiction upon the federal
courts, perhaps Congress can restrict that jurisdiction as well. My narrow point simply
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necessarily must paint with a broad brush. Yackle's own suggestions would, as I have observed, flood the federal courts. Shared
jurisdictional authority permits the courts to curtail excessive jurisdictional grants. That is not to say that judicial jurisdictional
decisions are always wise ones, and, when the courts stray from
the ideal, further congressional legislation may be in order. That
"dialogue" is the central point of the article Yackle discusses.
But Yackle's own example of the history of statutory federal
question jurisdiction suggests that simply to let Congress make
the decisions might overwhelm the courts with cases, taking up
judicial resources needed to address Yackle's real concern.
Fourth, and related, it is unclear how Yackle can really believe that drafting statutes like the ones he has will compel federal courts to do as he wishes. The history of federal jurisdiction
is replete with examples of the Supreme Court creatively interpreting statutes to achieve the goal it wishes. The federal question statute is one notorious example. Another is the habeas
corpus statute, whose language has meant many things at different times, depending upon the proclivities of the Justices.
Yackle's answers seem to be "clarity" in drafting and his proposal
for a catchall provision that requires jurisdictional statutes to be
"construed in a manner most favorable to the immediate adjudication of federal claims in federal court." But one person's clarity is another's ambiguity, as is evident from Yackle's somewhat
astonishing conclusion that "§ 1983[] is an express exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, .... "1s Taking Yackle's federal question statute as an example, how clear is it to mandate federal
jurisdiction if a federal question is "an essential element" of a
claim for relief? Was the federal question in Merrell Dow "essential" when the complaint spelled out several claims, and the
claim in question was essentially one of state law? I can easily
see the Supreme Court holding otherwise.
was to question the soundness of the position taken by some scholars that the granting
and restricting powers are not governed by the same rules. My broader point was that
there is a constitutional tension between congressional and Supreme Court power over
jurisdiction that is resolved as a practical matter on a case-by-case basis, as the Court
decides whether it must acquiesce in congressional pronouncements, or can exercise creative statutory construction to avoid conclusions that seem an inappropriate allocation of
jurisdictional authority. While Yackle does not like the jurisdictional conclusions of the
present Supreme Court, the Warren Court seems testament to the idea that at times judicial flexibility may serve to protect rights. Thus, I am uncertain why Yackle disagrees
with my conclusions (although I also recognize I am being used as a foil).
15. Yackle at 126 (cited in note 8). As I have observed elsewhere, on its face § 1983
gives "absolutely no clue of being such an exception." Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 18
(cited in note 14). Yackle's support, ironically, is not the statute, but the Supreme Court
decision in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Yackle at 259 n.32 (cited in note 8).
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Fifth, and most important, it is very difficult to understand
why Yackle necessarily wants to force the federal courts to decide the cases he cares about. Yackle states that "there is a relationship between rights themselves and the courts available to
enforce them," but is far too uncritical of exactly what the relationship is. For this reason, Yackle's solution is to mandate the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in almost every case. There may
be a virtue to the "passive virtues," however." It is common currency, accepted by Yackle, that decisions denying justiciability
generally reflect hostility to claims on the merits. Put another
way, if you force the courts to decide in many cases they find
nonjusticiable, they are likely to decide against claims of federal
right. Given this, why force the decision at all, when one could
hope the case for justiciability could be more effectively made (or
more sympathetically heard) when the courts are more open to
the validity of the claim on the merits?
While these five concerns indicate the problematic nature of
Yackle's approach, I think they all follow from a larger problem,
one to which I alluded earlier, and one that haunts much of the
scholarship in this area. The problem is that the entire corpus of
work is inexorably driven by the parity debate, which in tum results from the seminal nature of Hart and Wechsler's legal-process-oriented work. Applying legal process principles, Hart and
Wechsler did assume a certain fungibility of state and federal
courts, a fungibility that was evidently problematic during the
Warren Court era. Because Hart and Wechsler's work was seminal and because its underlying premise was problematic, a tension arose which scholars are trying to resolve to this day: Is it
possible to adhere to the Hart and Wechsler approach while disagreeing with their resolution of the parity question (and therefore with many of their conclusions)?16 This tension presents
itself repeatedly in today's federal jurisdiction scholarship. In
some instances, the tension manifests itself in an explicit debate
about the parity question.17 More frequently, old battles simply
16. It may be unfair to lump Hart and Wechsler together here. The casebook itself
is a teaching tool, more suggestive of answers than definitive. It is not at all clear that the
two agreed on conclusions, as their other work makes clear. For example, Wechsler
seemingly would give Congress much more control over federal jurisdiction than Hart.
Compare Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L Rev. 1001
(1965) with Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L Rev. 1362 (1953). See Friedman, 85 Nw.
U. L. Rev. at 31 n.173 (cited in note 14) (discussing how Hart's and Wechsler's positions
diverge).
17. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant
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are refought over the same ground Hart and Wechsler plowed.1 8
This latter approach is evident in Yackle's choice of subject matter: justiciability,19 abstention, federal question jurisdiction, and
habeas corpus.
1\vo problems permeate much of current federal jurisdiction
scholarship. First, parity is not a fixed concept and, second, Hart
and Wechsler's agenda, while pertinent, does not necessarily define what should be our own. The challenge we face is to develop
an agenda for the law of federal jurisdiction that will take us into
the next century. Part of that challenge is recognizing how the
mutability of the parity question should affect old questions. The
other part is recognizing what the new questions are that deserve
attention.
The parity question is not as simple or straightforward as
Yackle or others make it. While the federal courts were unquestionably the place to be in the 1960's and 1970's, that has not
always been true in the past and may not be true today. Looking
backward, the nationalizing Supreme Court under John Marshall
was hero in some respects, but certainly villain when it came to
the Alien and Sedition Acts. During the Lochner Era, both state
and federal courts proved their recalcitrance, but it is debatable
which court system was the real problem.zo Northern state
Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment On Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional
Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 329 (1988}.
18. I may be equally guilty here. Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 530 (1989}; Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L.
Rev. 247 (1988). I am not without countless companions, however. In the last few years,
the AALS Section on Federal Courts program has treated the parity debate (Symposium:
Federalism and Parity, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 593-664 (1991}}, habeas corpus (The Future of
Habeas Corpus: Reflections on Teague v. Lane and Beyond, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331-2531
(1993)), and federal common law making (Federal Courts Symposium, 12 Pace L. Rev.
227-357 (1992}).
19. Actually, justiciability-although it does pose the question of access to the federal courts-does not, strictly speaking, flow from the parity debate. Because many state
courts also apply justiciability doctrines, a non-justiciable controversy may be barred from
any court. Thus, in a sense, Yackle's treatment of justiciability seems a little out of place.
20. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the
Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. Amer. Hist. 63,64 (1985) (recognizing state courts
seen as even more reactionary than Supreme Court, but arguing that "with only a few
exceptions, state courts moved consistently toward approval of a wide range of reform
legislation"); Howard Gillman, The Constitution Beseiged 160-65 (Duke U. Press, 1993)
(discussing state court upholding of minimum wage laws, and Supreme Court striking of
such a law in Adkins v. Children's Hospital). Recall that the federal courts were attacked
for standing in the way of progress, and the attack was fueled by United States Supreme
Court decisions overturning favorable decisions of state courts. E.g., Traux v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 (1921) (overturning Arizona state decision permitting picketing in labor controversy); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overturning New York state decision
upholding maximum hour law for bakers).
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courts faced off with the Supreme Court over slavery.z1 Parity
(or disparity) inevitably is a shifting concept. But the problem is
even more complicated, for the nature of rights being protected
also changes. While it is debatable whether federal or state
courts were more protective of federal rights during the Lochner
Era,zz it is certain Yackle does not think any court should have
been protecting those federal constitutional rights.z3 Ex Parte
Young, a rights-protective jurisdictional decision, was protective
of economic rights.z4 Similarly, state courts challenged federal
courts on the slavery issue, but the federal court position was in
favor of the federal right to the return of fugitive slaves. Those
who prefer federal courts to vindicate federal rights also have a
selective view of what those rights should be. Given the changing nature of the rights protected by courts, and the changing
susceptibility of court systems to claims of right, there is limited
utility in any jurisdictional theory that always prefers one court
system.
Jurisdictional theory must account, somehow, with both the
changing approaches of state and federal courts and the changing
nature of rights. While this phenomenon does not necessarily
undermine keeping the federal courts open, it does raise new sets
of questions. Yackle criticizes Erwin Chemerinsky's "litigant
choice"zs solution to the parity problem, but Chemerinsky seems
correct, even if one is not persuaded by the tone of his argument.
If rights protection is the issue, more courts and more constitutions are the right direction, not simply pushing cases into federal
court. What may be wrong are doctrines like Pennhurst, which
keep federal courts from entertaining joint federal-state constitutional challenges to state action.z6 The relevant question is, assessing all the cases that might be brought, which ones make
most sense in which forum? There are implications here for diversity jurisdiction, for review of state administrative proceedings, and even for hearing fundamental rights claims. Many state
courts recently have demonstrated a willingness to protect rights
that far exceeds that of the federal courts. Civil liberties lawyer
21. E.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859).
22. See supra note 22.
23. Yackle at 23 (cited in note 8) ("they chose the wrong rights to protect").
24. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See James W. Ely, Jr., The Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller, 1888-1910 at 184 (U. of South Carolina Press, 1995) (discussing
Ex Parte Young's protection of property rights and Progressive's unhappiness with the
decision).
25. See Yackle at 42-43 (cited in note 8), discussing Chemerinsky, 36 UCLA L. Rev.
at 33 (cited in note 17).
26. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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today are going to think long and hard about which court system
to use, at least in states in which the state constitution is being
revitalized.
At bottom, jurisdiction is an allocative decision. The task is
to identify the claims that might be brought and assign them to
the tribunals most suited to addressing those claims. These tribunals do not simply include state and federal courts, but private
tribunals for alternate dispute resolution and numerous and varying state and federal administrative courts. Questions of ideology assuredly are relevant in making these allocative decisions,
but so are questions of cost and accessibility.
Moreover, jurisdictional allocation has to take place against
the backdrop of the pressing problems of the moment. Protection of constitutional rights deservedly is a paramount consideration.27 But there are many other problems that a sensible
jurisdictional scheme must take into account. Civil justice is becoming beyond the financial grasp of ordinary citizens. Newly
created federal offenses are swamping the federal courts. A
good deal of civil enforcement is taking place at the administrative level, and under programs of cooperative federalism many of
these cases (which may involve federal rights) have their start in
administrative agencies.
The changing nature of the parity question, and the plethora
of new problems that confront us, suggest that the law of federal
jurisdiction needs to confront itself with much more than the
problems stated in Hart and Wechsler's terms and played out
endlessly today. Federal courts scholars need to turn their attention to these new problems. While some are doing so,zs too
much time is being spent on rethinking old problems in old
27. Even with regard to constitutional rights, the bulk of these cases are criminal
cases that inevitably will be litigated in state court. Habeas corpus is little answer, given
the minuscule number of cases in which the writ is granted. See Daniel J. Meltzer,
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2507, 2524 (1993).
Professor Bator argued persuasively long ago that state courts inescapably will play a
central and continuing role in the adjudication of federal rights claims. Paul M. Bator,
The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605
(1981).
28. Much of Judith Resnik's work addresses new concerns facing federal courts.
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal
Trial Couns, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 909 (1990). Ann Althouse has shown even old subjects can
be addressed from quite a different perspective. Ann Althouse, Standing, In Fluffy Slippers, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1177 (1991). As part of a symposium on the Future of Federal Courts
Scholarship and Teaching, Resnik and Althouse recently provided perspectives on possible new directions in federal jurisdiction scholarship. Judith Resnik, Rereading 'The Federal Couns': Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the
Twentieth Century, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1021 (1994); Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions
in the Han and Wechshler Hotel, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 993 (1994).
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terms. Federal courts scholars should join civil procedure scholars in thinking of ways to streamline civil justice and best utilize
limited federal resources. They should join criminal law scholars
in addressing the proper use of federal criminal authority. They
should be concerned with gender and race bias in the courts.
Even in the area of enforcing constitutional rights it may be time
to devise new procedures or courts that make it easier for plaintiffs to have their claims heard quickly and cheaply. Not every
civil rights suit is a pathbreaking public law action, but the prohibitive cost of litigation may forestall claims being heard,
notwithstanding the availability of attorneys' fees.
Moreover, in addressing these new areas, federal courts
scholars need to open themselves up to the work being done in
other disciplines. The parity question itself raises overtones of
institutional choice, yet little federal courts scholarship draws
from the insights of public choice, game theory, or law and economics generally. Federal courts scholarship has proven itself remarkably insular, perhaps for reasons of the intricacy of the
doctrine making it inaccessible or uninteresting to scholars
outside the field. But federal courts scholars should seek to apply these tools to our own discipline.
This is admittedly a gangly, open-ended plea for innovation
and redirection. That is because the issues and problems that
confront court systems these days are gangly and open-ended.
But sorting out the problems of the next century are where our
efforts should be. There is something mystical and Talmudic
about the winding doctrine of abstention, habeas corpus, justiciability, and federal question jurisdiction that no doubt draws
us into the web of Hart and Wechsler's world and keeps us there.
But if we are to be relevant, we must be forward-looking. The
1960's are gone, and the future is upon us.

